air) in which the cost of an individual's use is borne by all while benefits accrue mostly to himself. 9 He argues that freedom to procreate will bring ruin to all.
Because individuals will continue exploiting the commons indefinitely, human beings always perceive an increase in personal benefits from additional exploitation to be greater than personal costs. 10 Hardin concludes therefore that if means cannot be found to divide the ownership of the commons to hold the individual liable for the total cost of his actions, or if prohibitions cannot be imposed to inhibit exploitation, the commons will be destroyed. Applying this approach to the question of procreation he states that " [F] reedom to breed is intolerable … [t] o couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action." 11 Hardin's statement encapsulates the thesis for the current research -to what extent does the finite nature of the commons pose a limitation to the right to procreate? Can any choice and decision regarding the establishment and size of a family irrevocably rest with the family itself? 12 It is clear that the proverb that every (English-)man's 9 He explains his theory as follows: [T)he tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component. 1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1 2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another ... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. Italics added. 10 Hardin 1968 Science 1247.
11 Hardin 1968 Science 1246. See, also, Goodwin 2012 Macalester Journal of Philosophy 42. 12 Thant International Planned Parenthood News 3 as quoted in Hardin 1968 Science 1247. home is his castle may seriously be challenged by the protection and maintenance of the commons. This contribution will consider the issue from a South African point of view which, in essence, entails a study of section 36 of the Constitution. This section principally regulates the limitation of constitutionally entrenched rights. However, for the sake of completeness a more general background regarding the limitation of the right to procreate against the background of ecological factors and socio-economic factors will be provided in paragraph 2.
Structuring of a social policy with regard to population control -a few introductory remarks
It is trite that it is the duty of the State as protector of the common good to protect and maintain the commons. 13 The situation may be complicated, though, as the State's responsibility to implement measures is multi-dimensional and often affected by the 14 Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 496. 15 See in this respect Golding and Golding 1970 Vand L Rev 495.
ecological and socio-economic underpinnings -water and food shortages and damaging of the environment (qua examples of the depletion of the commons) may be a direct, and sometimes are, a direct consequence of overpopulation. The question remains, then, whether limitations may be placed on the right to procreate because of socio-economic conditions and ecological factors.
Kotzé considers sustainability as the point of departure to structure a social policy.
Sustainability, according to him, is the balancing mechanism between the most basic (socio-economic) conditions of human existence on the one hand and ecological interests on the other 16 -more of the one implies less of the other unless a compromise is found which affords equal importance to ecological, social and economic interests. in the availability of the most basic socio-economic conditions of human existence? It appears that there is not sufficient clarity in the identification of the threat or how to address it. For instance, overcrowding certainly is a threat, but does this necessarily mean that the number of people must be reduced? It is suggested that the exact nature of the threat as well as what it is that is threatened must be identified also to reflect on the question whether overpopulation and dwindling resources may serve as a limitation to the right to procreate. It will be argued in paragraph 5 infra that clarity must be had on these issues before section 36 of the Constitution can be invoked.
It is not altogether clear how to structure a social policy regarding population growth. This is largely due to the fact that there is no single body of received opinion that applies unconditionally. As the point of departure, though, it is accepted that the problem cannot simply be human survival or, put somewhat differently, the survival of the human species. It cannot be accepted unconditionally that the human species will not survive if the population were not limited; the species would survive even if Arguing as they do that mere survival cannot be the justification for a social policy, Golding and Golding depart from the point that it is a form of ethical life that must be protected -it is "our" obligation "to promote what is good". 18 To determine good in situations where a choice must be exercised, good is rarely a single good, but rather a cluster of goods. Every good has its own, legitimate appeal but all goods cannot be realised simultaneously and in the same degree. Different goods must therefore be ranked into relations of higher and lower when exercising a choice and even if it is not always clear where on a valuation scale a particular good finds itself, ranking nevertheless does take place. The authors provide 19 the following example as a scale for ranking: Going from lower to higher life or survival takes the lowest position.
Material goods, recreational pursuit, friendship, knowledge, love and "radiant virtue" then follow. Debate may ensue about where a specific good must be located and the estimation may vary due to one's disposition.
Values do not only display a ranking in accordance with "valuational" height but also in accordance with "valuational" strength, in the sense that some may be stronger and some weaker. Friendship and love are higher on the valuation scale but a breach of friendship or an incapacity to love is not regarded as seriously as murder. Life (survival) is a stronger value and the deduction is made that the strength of a value is measured by the gravity of the violation against it -the good attendant upon the realization of a value is inversely proportional to the gravity of its violence. 20 The position is explained as follows by Hartmann:
The higher value is always the more conditioned, the more dependent and in this sense the weaker; its fulfilment is conceivable only in so far as it is raised upon the fulfilment of the lower values. But the more unconditioned, the more elementary, and in this sense the stronger value is always the lower; it is only a base for the The detrimental effect of an over-populated earth is well documented and in this paragraph only a brief exposition of the state of the commons in South Africa will be provided. More specifically population growth and the exploitation of the environment for financial gain will be addressed. These are but two of the major contributors in a plethora of circumstances. 24 Issues not referred to include, inter alia, cultural and
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Hartmann as referred to by Golding and Golding 1970 as Asia and Latin America have more than halved during the last 50 years, the rates in Sub-Saharan Africa remain high. The average total fertility rate in this region has countries are responsible for 86% of total private consumption compared with the poorest 20%, who account for only 1.3%. The richest 20% account for 53% of carbon dioxide emissions and the poorest 20% for 3%. A child born in the industrial world adds more to consumption and pollution levels in one lifetime than do 30-50 children born in developing countries. The authors warn that as living standards rise in developing countries the environmental consequences of population growth are amplified with ever-increasing numbers of people aspiring to "live better". Trends relating to the three "renewable" resources on which human life depends, namely water, air and land are becoming visible; eg 5-7 million hectares of agricultural lands are lost to accelerating land degradation and rapid urbanization every year; population growth in 2025 will lead to approximately 3 billion people in 48 countries being seriously affected by water shortages and rising sea levels because of C02 emissions, which will seriously disrupt agricultural production. When looking at the figures and statistics in the previous paragraph it must immediately be stressed that population growth, even though it is declining, is still higher than the average. It is commonly accepted that lack of skills and inability to enter the job market and secure good employment stems from a poor education background and results, inter alia, in higher population growth figures. 29 As such the population growth may be viewed as a symptom of poor education. However, its effects on the environment must still be evaluated. For the current purposes suffice it to evaluate the effect of the growth of the population on the water supply of the country. It speaks for itself that sustainable water provision is a critical component of the development of a society. In this respect South Africa faces severe challenges, since 65% the country is semi-arid. In this area the average rainfall is 450 mm/year, which is well below the world average of 860 mm/year. The country's water resources are scarce and limited in extent. In fact, the country is categorised as water-stressed, with an annual fresh water availability of less than 1700 m 3 per capita (the index for water stress). In fact, the current estimate is 1154 m 3 per capita/year and it is estimated that in 2025 the country will be among the countries in the world that will physically experience water scarcity with an annual fresh water availability of less than 1000 m 3 per capita (the index for water scarcity). A further complicating aspect relates to the unevenness of water resources across the country, which is compounded by a strong seasonality of rainfall. It is expected that in 2025 several water management areas will experience severe water deficits.
The demand for water is set to become a major concern. Already in 2004 Otieno and Ochieng commented on the position as follows:
Water demand projections in South Africa indicate an annual growth rate of 1.5% between 1990 and 2005 with 3.5% predicted for urban and industrial use and 1% for irrigation. Despite the conventional demand sectors, a major but salient demand sector is the "productive uses" of water at household level and village based enterprises. This sector is predicted to more than double the water supply volume to become more demand responsive and sustainable. Water transfer from surplus to deficit areas is also increasing leading to reduced availability in the transfer area. With the increase in population coupled with increased human activities, the impact of organisations or individuals on the water quality in rivers, streams, groundwater and wetlands will make water unavailable through pollution. Deteriorating water quality is one of the major threats to South Africa's capability to provide sufficient water of appropriate quality to meet its needs and to ensure environmental sustainability. These conditions will put pressure on the already stressed water systems leading to a reduction in water availability, a situation likely to result in increase in conflicts over water affectation. Various provisions in the South African Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution contain prescripts which are relevant for the current discussion. They include section 12(2), which provides for the right to bodily and psychological integrity and which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and the right to security in, and control over, one's body; section 24(b), which entails the right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations; and section 27(1)(b), which reads that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water. The constitutional framework against which these provisions have to be understood, it is suggested, is to be found in the provisions in relation to privacy and dignity contained in sections 10 and 14 of the Constitution. 31 The rights to privacy and dignity serve as fortification of the right to make decisions about reproduction. 32
Unlike almost all international instruments and some foreign constitutions, 33 the South African Constitution 34 does not contain a provision recognising the family as the basic unit of society. Neither is there any mention of the right freely to marry or to establish a family life. 35 The Constitutional Court explains that this omission must be understood in the context of South Africa being a multi-cultural jurisdiction:
The absence of marriage and family rights in many African and Asian countries reflects the multi-cultural and multi-faith character of such societies. Families are constituted, function and are dissolved in such a variety of ways, and the possible outcomes of constitutionalising family rights are so uncertain, that constitutionmakers appear frequently to prefer not to regard the right to marry or to pursue family life as a fundamental right that is appropriate for definition in constitutionalised terms. International experience accordingly suggests that a wide range of options on the subject would have been compatible with CP (constitutional principle) ll. On the one hand, the provisions of the NT (new text) would clearly prohibit any arbitrary State interference with the right to marry or to establish and raise a family. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 35 In re Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 96. Ss 12(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution provides for the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the right to security in and control over one's body.
enshrines the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, while NT 10 states that everyone has the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 36 It is clear that the court considers the constitutional safeguards, despite the absence of clauses expressly protecting the right to family life, sufficient to meet the obligations imposed by international human rights law to protect the rights of persons freely to marry and raise a family. In Dawood, Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs the court explains that marriage and family are matters of defining significance for many if not most people. 37 In particular the value of dignity in interpreting constitutional rights on the one hand and the right to dignity as enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution on the other are of particular relevance. In Dawood the Court held that the right to dignity is the primary right under these circumstances. Prohibiting a marriage relationship or the raising of a family would "[i]mpair(s) the ability of the individual to achieve personal fulfilment in an aspect of life that is of central significance". 38 The right is justiciable. As such it must be respected and protected, yet it may also be limited. 39
Scope of the rights to privacy and dignity
The value of human dignity is safeguarded and promoted by the recognition of the right to dignity in the Bill of Rights. The central importance of this right was emphasised as follows by the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane: 40 The right to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in the Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights above all others.
36
In The right to privacy enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution serves to protect and foster the right to dignity. 41 The section provides that everyone has the right to privacy and has on several occasions enjoyed the attention of the Constitutional Court. In
Bernstein v Bester 42 the Court remarked as follows:
The concept of privacy is an amorphous and elusive one ... The scope of privacy has been closely related to the concept of identity and it has been stated that "rights, like the right to privacy, are not based on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on the notion of what is necessary to have one's own autonomous identity. ..." The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that community rights and rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.
The places her far away from the inner sanctum of projected privacy rights. 49 However, even though it is less difficult for the State to establish that the limitation is justifiable, the suppression of commercial sex cannot be justified merely on the basis of enforcing a particular view of morality. Reasons advanced by the State to justify such suppression therefore include that prostitution in itself is degrading to women; that it is conducive to violent abuse of prostitutes by both customers and pimps; that it is associated with, and encourages international trafficking in women; that it leads to child prostitution; that it carries an intensified risk of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases; that it goes hand in hand with high degrees of drug abuse; that it has close connections with other crimes; and that it is a frequent and persistent cause of public nuisance. 50 The Court consequently points out that there is a strong public interest in the regulation of prostitution in a manner which will foster the achievement of equality between men and women. 51
The right to make decisions about reproduction enshrined in section 12(2)(a) of the Constitution
Section 12(2) stipulates that everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right, inter alia, to make decisions concerning reproduction. The inclusion of this right serves as a recognition that the power to make decisions about reproduction is a crucial aspect of control over one's body. 52 It is suggested that the interpretation of this right to a substantial extent stems from the right to privacy and in fact appears to be bearing out on it. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that there is little case law on the particular provision. In Christian Lawyers The court argues that section 12(2)(a) affords everyone in explicit language the right to bodily integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning reproduction.
This provision clearly includes the right to choose whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. This constitutional right is reinforced by various other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, including the inherent right to dignity, to have one's dignity respected and protected, the right to privacy and the right to have access to reproductive health care. 55 A strong basis for the right to the termination of pregnancy is provided by the cumulative effect of the specific provision in section 12(2)(a) as reinforced by other constitutional rights. 56
From this perspective it is clear that the State may not unduly interfere with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. However, as with all other constitutional rights, the Court concludes that the right to the termination of pregnancy is not absolute.
The state has a legitimate role, in the protection of pre-natal life as an important value in our society, to regulate and limit the woman's right to choose in that regard. However, because the right itself is derived from the Constitution the regulation thereof by the state may amount to the denial of that right. Similarly any limitation of the right constitutes a limitation of a woman's fundamental right and is therefore valid only to the extent that such limitation is justifiable 57 in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. It is suggested that as such it has to be considered similarly, for instance, to the right to religious freedom.
Prima facie the right to make decisions concerning reproduction is couched in similar terms as the constitutional right to religious freedom -"[E]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion." 59 In Prince v President, Cape Law Society 60 the Constitutional Court explained the nature of the right to religious freedom as follows:
[t]he right to freedom of religion at least comprehends: (a) the right to entertain the religious beliefs that one chooses to entertain; (b) the right to announce one's religious beliefs publicly and without fear of reprisal; and (c) the right to manifest such beliefs by worship and practice, teaching and dissemination. 
Limitation of constitutionally entrenched rights -general background
It is trite that constitutional rights may be limited; no right applies without limits.
Section 8(1) of the Bill of Rights provides that the Bill applies to all law and that it binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of State. This provision is self-explanatory, and suffice it to note that "law" in this section has to be broadly interpreted so as to include statutory law, common law and also customary law.
Section 36(2) provides that the limitation of a constitutionally entrenched right must comply with the prescriptions of section 36(1) or with the dictates of any other provision of the Constitution. In terms of section 36(1) the limitation of a constitutionally protected right must adhere to the following requirements:
 the limitation must be sanctioned by law of general application;  must be reasonable; and  must be justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and also the availability of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
Section 36 in essence provides for a two-stage approach to the question of the limitation of a constitutional right: Has such a right been infringed by law or the conduct of another person and, depending on a positive answer, can the infringement be justified as a permissible limitation of the right? It needs no further illumination that a statutory provision to the effect that procreation be limited would constitute an infringement of this right. The reasonableness of such a limitation must then be established. In this respect it is important to note that a court will not determine in the abstract whether the limitation is justifiable in an open and democratic society. On the contrary, evidence about the impact, for instance sociological evidence or statistical data about the impact of such a legislative restriction on society, must be presented. 74 Where justification rests on policy or factual considerations, such must be put before the court. Failure to do so may lead to a deduction that the limitation is not justifiable. 75 Certain definite requirements pertaining to the limitation of constitutional rights have developed:
 Law of general application includes legislation, delegated legislation and the South African common law. To qualify as "law" under this rubric, a rule of these sources must be accessible, precise and of general application.

The requirement of reasonableness and justifiability has given rise to a substantial body of jurisprudence. In essence the requirement of reasonableness is aimed at ensuring that a law should not invade a right any further than it needs in order to achieve its purpose. The requirement conveys that it must be shown that the particular law serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient proportionality between the infringement of the fundamental right in question and the benefit it is designed to achieve.
The requirement of reasonableness was held to mean that a law or action limiting a right must have a reasonable goal and also that the means for achieving that goal must be reasonable. 76 In S v Makwanyane 77 the Constitutional Court explained the position as follows:
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See eg S v Meaker 1998 8 BCLR 1038 (W), where the court held at 1047A-G that it is not necessarily required that vast amounts of sources to substantiate an argument be put before a court. A "common sense analysis" of the purpose and need for legislation and of the "social and economic" milieu giving rise to the legislations would be sufficient. The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. ... The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for "an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality", means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.
This cautious approach was echoed later in a number of decisions. In S v Manamela 78
the Court explained that it has to engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality. It is not to adhere mechanically to a sequential checklist.
As a general rule, however, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the justification must be. Ultimately the question is one of degree, to be assessed in the concrete and legislative and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in the country but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected. 79 The nature of the right is of particular relevance. Most of the constitutionally entrenched rights are textually unqualified. The provision in section 11 that everyone has the right to life is, for example, not textually qualified and the only limitations placed on it are those imposed by section 36. However, the scope of some of the rights contained in the Bill is qualified by language that specifically demarcates their application. Section 12(2) of the Bill indeed serves as an example in point -the right to freedom of religion is limited by the provisions of section 31 in the sense that it may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
In similar fashion section 17 provides for the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket The State advocates that one couple has only one child. Except for special cases, with approval for second birth, government officials, workers and urban residents can only have one child for each couple. In rural areas, the State also advocates that each couple has only one child. However, with approval, those who have real difficulties can have their second child, several years after the birth of the first. that is based on ethnicity etc) and 31 (which provides that the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any other right contained in the Bill).
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Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 1. 82 Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 2.
second child were excluded from these benefits and suffered financial penalties such as financial levies on each additional child and sanctions which ranged from social pressure to curtailed career prospects in government jobs. Urban couples were persuaded more easily, but rural families were difficult to convince. Peasants with limited savings and without government pensions effectively still needed their children to support them in old age. Traditionally a married daughter would move into her husband's family home and lineage. A son was therefore essential to meet the demands of labour on farms and related businesses. Social control in the rural areas was weakened by the collapse of the old commune system due to the post-Mao economic reform. Local authorities were therefore forced to rely on fines to discourage higher order births and they embarked upon stringent birth control campaigns. Many women were consequently bullied into abortion and sterilisation. Since 1985 a softening of policy and a relaxing of the requirements to permit a second child have occurred. By 2001 a second birth was permitted if the first child in rural areas was a girl, if the couple were only children, or if the only child was disabled.
The one-child policy was successful in achieving the goals it was meant to achieve. It replaced by a "social compensation fee" which ranges from 10% of one's annual income in poor rural areas to three to seven times one's income in some urban areas. 83
The one-child policy has had severe unintended impacts on the social and economic situation in China. These include inter alia an unbalanced gender ratio as well as an unbalanced urban-rural ratio of newborns. It is the unbalanced gender ratio especially 83 Settles 
Conclusion
The limitation of the constitutional right to make decisions concerning reproduction is bound to be controversial. It is therefore important that a clear mind must address the question of why such limitation is required. Mere survival cannot serve as the justification for a social policy to this effect -rather, it is ethical life or whatever may be described as being good that must be protected. The exposition of the situation in China in paragraph 3.4 shows that such an ethical life must be accurately identified to insure that the means to be employed will not ultimately destroy it. It would appear, though, that the state of the commons in South Africa is poor. The 767% growth in population in the period 1911-2011 and the scarcity and serious deterioration of the quality of water bear on the worrisome situation. In fact, these factors serve as indicators that social policy in respect of population growth should be pro-active and that it may indeed be justified to limit constitutionally entrenched rights in this respect. 85 The inner sanctum of the individual is shielded "[f]rom erosion by conflicting rights of the community". 86 However, in similar vein as the right to religious freedom, it would appear that the right enshrined in section 12(2) of the Constitution relates to decisions regarding reproduction -that constitutes the inner-sanctum that may not be eroded.
The outward manifestation of the right (procreation), however, reflects an aspect of 84 See Settles and Sheng "The One-child Policy" 6 for a comprehensive discussion of the negative consequences of the one-child policy. 
